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S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire
History, Interpretation, and the Canadian Experience
Robert Engen

I

n April of 2011 readers of the
Winnipeg Free Press may have
been surprised to learn that most
American soldiers in the Second
World War would not fight or kill in
battle. A column by Gwynne Dyer,
one of Canada’s best-known military
writers, likely gave many lay-readers
their first exposure to what is actually
a very old idea, that soldiers would
not participate in battle.1 Although
the article is about post-traumatic
stress disorder, it refers to the famous
observations of American military
icon Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall
on the widespread non-participation
of infantrymen in battle, which he
supposedly observed during the
Second World War. Dyer’s opinion
piece is the latest in a large body of
scholarship that treats Marshall’s
work as authoritative and ensures
its prominent place in discussions
on the human dimensions of
warfare. However, Marshall’s work
has also been severely criticized.
This article joins the debate by
introducing new historical evidence
and reconceptualising some of the
assumptions surrounding human
behaviour in warfare.
S.L.A. Marshall needs little
introduction to a military audience.
Best-remembered for the work he
did with the US Army’s Historical
Section during the Second World

Abstract: The famous “ratio of fire”
data proposed by S.L.A. Marshall
claims that no more than 15-20
percent of soldiers fired their
weapons in combat. This article
examines whether or not historians
can treat Marshall’s ratio of fire
data as veracious, and if so what
interpretations one can assign to
the phenomenon of combat nonparticipation. The article contends
that based upon the Canadian
experience it is premature to
universalize Marshall’s findings
beyond his specific his torical
subjects, and that studies of human
behaviour in war need to look beyond
the ratio of fire data as a paradigm for
understanding the conduct of soldiers
in battle.

War, he was a military writer who
helped shape the mid-20th century
American fighting forces and the
writing of their history. Although
he authored many major works,
Marshall’s modern pre-eminence
rests upon just one: the “modern
classic” Men Against Fire (1947) and
the extraordinary claims it made
about the propensity of infantrymen
not to do any actual fighting in
battle. Marshall’s core thesis was
that only 15 to 20 percent of combat
infantrymen ever fired their weapons
in battle; he was the first to document
that most riflemen were spectators.
Marshall extrapolated his findings
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into a universal law of human
behaviour in warfare, claiming that
the disinclination of most soldiers
to fight was actually ubiquitous
throughout history, underreported
only because “in earlier wars there
had never existed the opportunity
for systematic collection of data.”2
This data on non-firing and nonfighting soldiers, for which Marshall
coined the term “ratio of fire,” became
extremely popular, and some —
including Dyer — have credited
him with revolutionizing postwar
infantry training through his studies.3
However, since the 1980s more critical
scholarship has called attention
to Marshall’s desultory, some say
nonexistent, evidence, his propensity
for exaggeration, the testimony of
witnesses claiming Marshall never
systematically collected data, and
his personal character.4 Marshall’s
academic supporters have in turn
defended him, attempting to prove
the accuracy of Men Against Fire’s
claims, often by citing the numerous
and very important individuals who
believed what he wrote.5 At times the
debate has descended to the level of
muck-raking and in some quarters
has taken on the characteristics of a
personal feud.6
Unfortunately, this academic
quarrel has strayed from the
evidence; not just whether there
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S.L.A. Marshall

is evidence to buttress Marshall’s
extraordinary claims, but what
that evidence actually means. Men
Against Fire succeeded in shaping
the assumptions of this debate, and
these assumptions have rarely been
questioned. For instance: what does
it really mean when soldiers are not
firing their weapons in battle? Is this
non-firing unconscious — cowardice,
combat fatigue, a genetic instinct to do
no harm to others? Or is it deliberate
— malingering, tactical necessity,
or (something rarely considered) a
part of soldiers’ training? Are these
meanings stable and static — are they
roughly the same across the breadth
of human experience — or are they
unstable and historically specific?
Can one place non-firing soldiers
into different categories or does this
phenomenon always indicate the
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same thing? These are all questions
stemming from the presumption that
Marshall’s ratio of fire argument is a
truly accurate portrayal of combat;
the issue is complicated further if one
accepts the critics’ challenge to treat
Marshall’s evidence as compromised
and untrustworthy.
This article is part of a wider effort
to explore the validity of Marshall’s
ratio of fire data, and to further the
debate further by grounding it in
the historical evidence. It explores
the meaning of fire ratios rather
than simply arguing about whether
Marshall’s specific claims are correct
or not, and will hopefully add depth
to the questions posed above. This
discussion will be based heavily upon
Canadian military archival records
detailing land warfare in the Second
World War, the basis of my own

research. Marshall studied American
soldiers, but the Canadian and US
armies fought in the same theatres
of war against the same enemy with
similar equipment from 1943 to 1945.
The Canadian Army provides a test
for the validity of Marshall’s claims
to the universality of his ratio of fire
theory; there are good Canadian
sources that speak to this issue.
Why is this important? The
ratio of fire numbers remain in
popular circulation today, forming
the empirical evidence for the
“killology” scholarship spearheaded
by Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.) Dave
Grossman. This sustained influence
is in large part because it has been
difficult to prove or disprove the ratio
of fire with documentary historical
evidence. Meanwhile, Marshall’s
defenders have argued that raising
these issues is tantamount to attacking,
for the sake of academic snobbery, an
old soldier who cannot fight back.7 But
this impassioned defence misses the
point of scholarly inquiry altogether.
Marshall’s ratio of fire, and the
singular interpretation derived from
it, has had a considerable effect on
the scholarship and has influenced
military policy. This alone is good
reason to explore and test some
of these assumptions. The recent
criticisms that have shown Marshall’s
work as potentially untrustworthy
add a further imperative to this task.

If Marshall Was Right:
Interpreting Non-Firing

M

arshall’s interpretation of his
own evidence begs definition.
Marshall argued the low ratio of fire
he observed in combat was due to
an inborn “fear of aggression” he
believed to be “part of the normal
man’s emotion make-up.” He
wrote in Men Against Fire that the
average, healthy individual, even
one who can endure the stresses
of combat, “still has such an inner
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and usually unrealized resistance
toward killing a fellow man that he
will not of his own volition take life
if it is possible to turn away from that
responsibility.”8 Marshall postulated
from his observations on the Second
World War a revolutionary idea that
he considered applicable to the entire
history of human warfare. Soldiers
were not firing because of an innate
resistance to killing others.
Marshall’s interpretation can be
summarized as follows: that soldiers
not using their weapons is a) a bad
thing, and b) represents a failure on
the part of the military training system
and the soldiers’ personal motivation

to overcome an assumed human
internal resistance to inflicting harm
on others. Men Against Fire stated
that infantrymen were unable to use
their weapons because of a conscious
or unconscious unwillingness to act
aggressively, to threaten, or to kill
others — even enemies attempting
to kill them. Only those soldiers
on crew-served weapons such as
machine guns would reliably fight all
the time; individual riflemen would
not. The subsequent popularity of
this interpretation is quite easy to
understand. It flatters humanists
because it affirms that most people
are inherently good and would

(could?) never hurt another person,
even a stranger or an enemy. It
simultaneously flatters those who do
fight and kill, affirming that they are
part of an elite group of warriors who
are either culturally or biologically
superior in this way to the rest of
the humanity, who are the “sheep”
waiting to be rescued, protected, and
turned into collateral casualties. This
argument has been enthusiastically
expanded by Grossman in recent
years, who claims that through
proper training and conditioning
techniques the number of shooting
soldiers in combat can be raised to
virtually 100 percent, but without

US Army Photo

Soldiers of the US 2nd Infantry Division advance into Brest, France under German machine gun fire, 9 September 1944.
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A US Army anti-tank platoon searches for the position of a German machine
gun that had fired on their vehicle, the Netherlands, 4 November 1944.

these techniques only a bare handful
of soldiers will act in an aggressive
manner or in self-defence.9
As an intellectual exercise, let
us ignore Marshall’s critics for a
moment and take as a given that
his evidence is accurate: that in
the Pacific and European Theaters
of Operations no more than 15 to
20 percent of riflemen would ever
take an active role in combat. Still,
Marshall’s interpretation of the
data is not self-evident. During his
work with the army’s G-2 Historical
Section, Marshall carried out
hundreds of after-action interviews
with American rifle companies,
using a group-interview process to
reconstruct the action. He claimed to
have interviewed over 600 different
companies, though as Roger Spiller
pointed out, going by Marshall’s own
estimation of the time needed to carry
out a group interview that number
was impossibly high and would have
had him interviewing rifle companies
42
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well into the postwar years, which he
did not.10 He certainly did not have
time to carry out follow-up interviews
with the same soldiers, and could not
have performed multiple interviews
with many companies. So what we
really have from Marshall is a set
of data examining how thousands
of soldiers fought, in one action
apiece. If he made inquiries about
weapon usage to find out who did
and did not fire their weapons in a
given action, then he would have
found out who used their weapons
in that one combat action. Even the
most generous commentator must
admit that there is no way to use
that data to forecast whether the
same soldiers would fire or not in
future actions, or if they had behaved
similarly in past instances. All that
Marshall’s data does, assuming it
exists and is accurate, is establish
that in any given action, most soldiers
would not use their weapons. But
without follow-up interviews with

the same rifle companies in which
individual soldiers’ behaviour in
subsequent combat was mapped
against the behaviour noted during
the initial interview, Marshall had
no way of knowing if the ratio of
fire was accounted for by the same
soldiers not firing every time, or if
it was a steady group average with
different riflemen firing in each
instance. Because detailed follow-up
interviews were unlikely (Marshall’s
historical reporting responsibilities
took him where the main action was,
and he rarely spent more than a few
days with a company), Marshall’s
“resistance to killing” theory is not
self-evident from his data.
The inherent inability of human
beings to kill posited by Marshall
becomes only one of several plausible
scenarios that can be read into this
data. A partial list might take into
consideration the following without
exhausting the possibilities: soldiers
did not fire because they were afraid;
4
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because they were passively resisting;
because they were suffering from
combat stress reactions, so-called
“battle exhaustion”; because they
did not want to provoke enemy
retaliation; because of a “live and let
live” mentality; because the tactical
situation or the terrain did not call
for or allow effective small arms fire;
because they had been trained to
exercise strict fire discipline; because
they had been ordered not to fire.
Other possibilities exist. One can
place these interpretations into two
rough categories:

The notion of an inborn resistance
to killing is extremely difficult to
prove and relies upon indirect and
usually ambiguous evidence. 11
Conversely, there is credible
documentary historical evidence
supporting all of the other reasons
for not firing charted above. There
is no space, unfortunately, to go
over each interpretation in detail,
though they are all familiar topics
in military studies. In Canada
excellent work has been published
on battle exhaustion, fear reactions,
and military malingering and

Deliberate Non-Firing

Involuntary Non-Firing

Malingering / passive resistance
“Live and Let Live”
No opportunity to fire
Fire discipline

Resistance to killing
Fear reactions
Battle exhaustion

insubordination. 12 All of them
present potential explanations for
why soldiers might elect not to
fire, or might have no choice in the
matter. The development of “live
and let live” systems in combat and
the meanings behind them is more
controversial. The phenomenon is
certainly documented, and informal
cease-fires on quiet areas of a front
had as much to do with not wanting
to die for no reason as they did with
not wanting to kill, and could be a
rational response to the challenge
of surviving in combat completely
divorced from notions of a resistance
to killing. 13 There have also been
excellent studies showing that on
the ghostly, dispersed battlefields
of the Second World War, it could
sometimes be difficult to locate a
target to engage at all, and soldiers
trained to fire on a living, breathing

Library and Archives Canada PA 129043

Canadian soldiers occupy slit trenches shortly after the D-Day landings.
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A rifleman in the Regina Rifles mans a firing position in Cardonville
Farm near Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse, Normandy, 8-10 June 1944.

target might rarely have the
opportunity to do so.14
One subject that is seldom treated
in relation to Marshall’s work is fire
discipline, the deliberate withholding
of fire in a combat situation. This is
unfortunate, as fire discipline has
impressive explanatory power for
non-firing during the Second World
War. It is worth going into in some
detail.
In the Canadian Army between
1939 and 1945 the tactical ideal being
taught and trained for was controlled
and highly-disciplined infantry
small arms fire, not the saturation
of the battlefield with fire (though it
should be mentioned that the latter
often happened anyway in battle).
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Doctrine and training manuals from
before, during, and after the war
stressed that fire should be held
until it could be brought to bear
with maximum effectiveness, and in
places these publications discouraged
riflemen from firing.15 A Canadian
Officer Training Corps instructors’
manual from 1944 explained that,
“To produce one casualty in the last
war some statistician has figured
out that it cost 75,000 rounds of
small arms ammunition. This was
in static warfare when the troops
were stationary. What will it require
in this mobile warfare when speed
varies from 15 to 40 miles per hour?
Accuracy is doubly important,
Volume of Fire is not.”16 A I Canadian

Corps training letter from LieutenantGeneral H.D.G. Crerar in March 1943
articulated the point further, quoting
officers returned from combat in
North Africa:
everyone I’ve spoken to on the
subject agrees that we always open
fire too soon which has no effect
except to give away one’s position…
an early waste, and a subsequent
shortage at a later critical moment,
of precious ammunition, is typical
of inadequately trained troops, the
first time in action. The results can
be disastrous.17

Training for fire discipline, as it was
carried out in the Canadian military,

6

Engen: S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire
seems to have been conditioned by
the fact that inexperienced soldiers
could blaze away too freely with
their weapons, firing when panicky
and nervous rather than making
intelligent and controlled use of
their small arms. The Canadian Army
Training Memoranda issued during the
Second World War frequently had
disparaging remarks on the tendency
of troops to fire too soon and too
much, and in a May 1944 article tried
to invoke the feelings of battle:
You are trained to shoot straight, you
have plenty of ammunition to hand
back for the killing of your chaps;
but make sure of it – wait – wait and
again wait even if you are frantically
excited – WAIT!18

With training and experience there
ideally came the tendency to fire less
and more accurately, rather than
more. Marshall would have seen
this as a problem, but these ideas
underwrote the training of Canadian
infantrymen for battle.
Canadian accounts from the
fighting in the Second World War, in
the form of detailed after-action battle
experience questionnaires and war
diary extracts compiled by Canada’s
own Army Historical Section,
frequently discuss how fire discipline
was being achieved and employed
or to bemoan its absence. When
comment on the volume of small
arms fire was made in the infantry
questionnaires it was typically to
criticize too much undisciplined
fire; no mention was ever made of
insufficient shooting or infantry
non-participation.19 Historical Section
extracts from Canadian regimental
war diaries, circulated during the
fighting as “lessons learned” briefs,
reveal similar attitudes towards fire
discipline. Soldiers were urged to
maintain the forward momentum
of an attack by holding their fire
and bypassing pockets of the enemy
rather than stopping to exchange fire
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with them.20 Other reports observed
despairingly that this was not always
being carried out, and that recklessly
large amounts of small arms fire
was standard procedure in some
infantry units.21 A balance always
had to be struck. The enemy seldom
revealed his presence, and firing
at possible positions could inflict
casualties or, more likely and just as
useful, compel him to keep his head
down and thus be incapable of firing
back. Yet this also risked betraying
one’s own position. As Roger Spiller
pointed out in his original critique
of Marshall, revealing your location
to a battle-hardened enemy could
mean death, and the production of
too much small arms fire was the
surest way to broadcast your precise
whereabouts.22
Platoon and company leaders had
different reactions to official policies
of fire discipline. Many favoured
tightly-controlled infantry fire, while
others had no problem with their
men scavenging extra automatic
weapons from wrecked carriers to
supplement the amount of fire they
could produce.23 Widespread triggerhappiness and excessive firing among
the other ranks was often cited as a
concern in contemporary analyses,
but how serious a “problem” this
was is uncertain because Canadian
infantry fire tactics relied upon the
ability of rifle sections to generate
small arms fire in volume when
needed. 24 Generally speaking, for
Canadians the problem was too
much wasteful firing, not failures
to fire. There is a high probability
that many instances of non-firing
may be attributable to deliberate
tactical decisions, rather than being
indications of non-participation or of
an innate resistance to killing. Other
instances of non-firing could well
have been the result of a combination
of factors, both deliberate and
involuntary.
There is some limited
evidence independent of Marshall

documenting infantry non-firing
in battle and indicating it was
considered a problem at some points
in the Second World War. Most of
these complaints seem almost entirely
to originate from US Army reports.25
A handful of postwar (and therefore
potentially influenced by Marshall)
Canadian accounts discuss infantry
non-firing, but overall there is very
little mention in Canadian sources of
non-firing as a problem which raises
questions about whether there was
a difference between the Canadian
and American experiences. Some of
the American sources that mentioned
non-firing as a problem also praise
fire discipline or, as is more typical of
Canadian reports, criticize excessive
shooting.26 What can be taken from
these apparent contradictions is that
the violence of combat gives rise to
confusion as few other experiences
can. In all likelihood some soldiers
did not fire their weapons or actively
participate in every battle, but for a
wide variety of reasons well beyond
the scope of a simplistic cultural or
biological “resistance to killing” that
determined who would or would
not fire. Even if S.L.A. Marshall was
entirely correct in his observations,
his interpretation of his own data is
weak and replete with difficulties.

If Marshall Was Wrong:
Assessing the Source

T

he case for Marshall’s work is
further compromised when one
abandons the assumption that his
ratio of fire data represent trustworthy
evidence. There is little evidence
to support the claims made in Men
Against Fire about infantry non-firing
being a universal phenomenon.
Contemporary Canadian evidence
of weapons’ usage on the battlefield
does not correlate with how Marshall
claimed soldiers behaved in battle.
There are also troubling questions
about Marshall’s reliability as a
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The available evidence concerning the actions of Canadian infantry in battle does not fit
with Marshall’s observations regarding US infantry. Here, soldiers of the Fusiliers MontRoyal attack near Oldenburg, Germany supported by British Churchill tanks, 29 April 1945.

scholarly source. A real possibility
exists that the famous ratio of fire
numbers were fabricated on the
basis of Marshall’s preconceptions
of combat.
For all his fine historical work –
and there was much of it – Marshall
was a man who suffered from a
scholarly myopia, and saw precisely
what he wanted to see. In his memoirs
Marshall described how during his
very first assignment as a combat
historian, at the US amphibious
assault on Makin Island in 1943, he
witnessed not the “universal” low
firing ratio he later championed, but
green US Marines with jittery nerves
hitting the beach and blazing away
with their weapons at anything that
moved and many things that did not.
It was the opposite of the ratio of fire:
frightened soldiers employing too
much fire to help calm themselves
and assert power over their situation.
Most importantly, Marshall wrote
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that he decided not to report on this
at the time, because at that point he
believed it was low firing ratios that
were the most serious problem of
modern infantry warfare.27 Marshall
wilfully disregarded important
evidence because he had already
made up his mind that non-firing was
the “real” problem – at his very first
deployment as a combat observer! He
allowed his preconceptions to govern
his findings. According to those who
knew him, this was not unusual for
Marshall. Colonel E.M. Parker, a
fellow analyst during the Korean War,
wrote that Marshall conducted his
interviews and research in such a way
as to support his tendentious ideas.28
One of his aides during the Second
World War, John Westover, made
similar comments: “Marshall was an
intuitive thinker. He did not gather
evidence, weigh it ponderously, draw
tentative hypotheses, then test them.
If he did, it was not in an organized

manner. Usually, from ‘out of the
blue’ he stated a principle. Then he
marshalled his evidence and statistics
to back his concepts. Some of his
statistics are subject to grave question
as to source.”29 Another former aide
was David Hackworth, who wrote
in his controversial memoir that,
“Veterans of many of the actions
[Marshall] ‘documented’ in his books
have complained bitterly over the
years of his inaccuracy or blatant bias.
It was a conscious effort on his part to
give the audience the impression he
was there…he didn’t seem to care that
what he wrote was totally inaccurate
and easily disproved. He seemed to
have relied (and successfully so) on
the notion that no one would ever
dare to correct him.”30 Serious issues
of academic credibility are at stake.
The literature on infantry combat
has also discussed the tendency
of inexperienced soldiers to shoot
wildly. The classic American study of
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social psychology in the Second World
War, carried out by Samuel Stouffer
and his team, surveyed American
GIs to identify (among many other
things) combat errors frequently
made by inexperienced soldiers.
“Shooting before they are able to
see their targets” was perceived as
an error far more prevalent among
inexperienced replacements than
others such as “freezing” or “not
being aggressive enough in combat.”
Stouffer commented: “Shooting
before they are able to see their target,
or being ‘trigger happy,’ is usually
interpreted as a sign of improperly
controlled anticipatory anxiety
or nervousness, which of course
was high among replacements.”
The Stouffer study concluded that
“seasoned combat men made all these
errors much less frequently.”31 Other
sources have likewise discussed how
the tendency of “green” soldiers is
to shoot to excess, and that training
and experience are required to bring
“trigger-happiness” under control.32
Marshall observed this phenomenon
firsthand on Makin Island, though
he ignored it. It is possible that a
reduction in a unit’s firing rates
could be an indicator of discipline,
experience, and good training, the
opposite of Marshall’s conclusion
that more fire was what won battles.
This possibility certainly deserves
further study.
It is also interesting to note that
studies were carried out during the
Second World War which investigated
infantry weapon usage in detail. The
British Weapons Technical Staff Field
Force (WTSFF) and its Canadian
wing carried out methodical postcombat reviews of infantry weapon
use, misuse, and technical difficulties.
The WTSFF staffs began their work
with the British Eighth Army in
North Africa in 1942, and conducted
studies of infantry weapons in over
100 rifle companies in North West
Europe between June 1944 and May
1945, interviewing commanding
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officers, junior officers, and private
soldiers.33 In many ways the WTSFF
teams carried out the kind of studies
that S.L.A. Marshall took credit for.
A report summarizing their findings
in May 1945 wrote:
From the Normandy beaches,
through the hedge-rows and woods
of the “Bocage” country, over the flat
Dutch country-side, to the tree and
hedge covered German plains, fields
of view have been short. Defensive
positions have been easily concealed
and usually sited with short fields of
fire. [Canadian] Units have sought
to achieve surprise in defence by
holding their fire until the enemy
were near.34

The report stresses the short
ranges and limited fields of fire
that Canadians had to deal with
throughout the campaign in
Normandy and Northwest Europe,
an environment in which survival
meant not giving away your position
by premature fire. The WTSFF
commentary on individual weapons’
usage and capabilities were quite
thorough: the Sten machine-carbine
was heavily criticized as unreliable,
whereas the standard-issue LeeEnfield No.4 Rifle was popular,
having “performed well” throughout
the campaigns.35 The WTSFF teams
investigating British and Dominions’
weapons’ usage did not appear
to have uncovered any indication
of widespread non-participation
in battle, and they were as wellpositioned as Marshall himself to
have observed such a phenomenon.36
While the absence of such comments
is not positive evidence, it stands to
reason that a military staff devoted to
researching how infantrymen were
or were not employing their small
arms in battle would have discovered
the “ratio of fire” problem Marshall
wrote about had it been present and
observable.

Conclusion: The Marshall
Paradigm

E

ven if Marshall was entirely
correct, his arguments and
interpretations present problems.
Conflicting evidence makes it
impossible to make a strong case
that Marshall’s ratio of fire was
based on fact, or that it was a
unversal phenomenon rather than
an historical phenomenon. That such
errors were ever made is troubling,
but moreso is the support that Men
Against Fire enjoys in military and
scholarly establishments. The ratio
of fire continues to attract supporters
despite two decades of criticism and
compelling contrary evidence, and
has undergone a recent renaissance
and resurgence.
The underlying problem with
this body of work is that Marshall’s
evidence on ratio of fire does not meet
the criteria for trustworthy historical
evidence. It is frequently reproduced
and cited not because of its accuracy
but because many important people
believe in it. But compelling evidence
shows that Marshall was factually
incorrect in his assertions that only
15-20 percent of riflemen fired their
weapons in the Second World War.
Even if he was wholly correct, his
interpretation of the meaning of this
phenomenon does not stand up well
to scrutiny. The best case one can
make for Marshall is that he might
have discovered low volumes of
fire in American rifle companies at
certain times, but even this possibility
represents the beginning of a scholarly
discussion rather than a self-evident
endpoint. If a low volume of fire
was a significant phenomenon, what
may have accounted for differences
between the American and Canadian
experience? Were the differences
attributable to varied training
schemes? To personal motivation
and the conscript/volunteer divide?
To cultural or institutional forces?

47
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To perceptions of “correct” behavior
in combat? These questions have not
been answered, and to universalize
Marshall’s findings beyond the
specific subjects he studied is
premature. New understandings of
fire ratios and human behaviour in
warfare will have to look beyond
Marshall’s narrow paradigm.
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